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Babylonian Talmud: Tractate Kethuboth
and one who makes a voluntary admission in a penal case is exempt.1 But the Rabbis are of the opinion that the claim2 is [mainly] in respect of compensation for indignity and blemish.3 On what principle do they4 differ? — R. Papa replied: R. Simeon is of the opinion that a man would not leave that which is fixed5 to claim6 that which is not fixed,7 while the Rabbis hold the view that no man would leave a claim6 from which [the defendant] could not be exempt even if he made a voluntary admission8 and advance a claim9 from which he would be exempt10 if he made a voluntary admission.
R. Abina enquired of R. Shesheth: To whom belongs the handiwork of a daughter who11 is maintained12 by her brothers?13 Are they14 in loco parentis and as in that case her handiwork belongs to her father so here also it belongs to her brothers; or [is it more reasonable that] they should not be compared to their father, for in his case she is maintained out of his own estate but here she is not maintained out of their estate?15 — He replied: You have learned about such a case: A widow is to be maintained out of the estate of [her deceased husband's] orphans, and her handiwork belongs to them.16 [But] are [the two cases in every way] alike? It may not be any satisfaction to a man that his widow should be liberally provided for,17 but he might well be pleased, might he not, that his daughter should?18
Does this19 imply that a man has preference for his daughter than for his widow? Surely. R. Abba said in the name of R. Jose:20 The relationship between21 a widow and her daughter, in the case of a small estate,22 has been put on the same level as that of the relationship between21 a daughter and her brothers. As in the case of the relationship between a daughter and her brothers, the daughter is maintained23 while the brothers can go begging at [people's] doors, so also in the case of the relationship between a widow and her daughter, the widow is maintained and the daughter can go begging at [people's] doors;24 [which shews, does it not, that the widow is given preference]? — As regards [provision against] degradation25 a man gives preference to his widow;26 as regards liberal provision27 he gives preference to his daughter.28
R. Joseph objected: HER HANDIWORK, HOWEVER, AND ANYTHING SHE FINDS, EVEN IF SHE HAS NOT COLLECTED [THE PROCEEDS], BELONG TO HER BROTHERS IF HER FATHER DIED. The reason29 then is30 that [they originated during] the lifetime of their father, but [if they originated] after his death [they would belong] to herself. Does not [this refer to a daughter] who is maintained?31 — No; [this is a case of one] who is not maintained.32 If she is not maintained, what need is there to state [such a case]?33 For even according to him who ruled that a master is entitled to say to his bondman, 'Work for me and I will not maintain you'34 the ruling applies only to a Canaanite bondman concerning whom 'With thee' was not written in Scripture, but not to a Hebrew slave concerning whom with thee35 was written in Scripture. How much less [then would such a ruling apply] to one's daughter? — Rabbah b. 'Ulla replied: It36 was only required in the case of a surplus.37
Said Raba: Did not such a great man as R. Joseph know that [sometimes there may] be a surplus when he raised his objection?38 The fact however is, Raba explained, that R. Joseph raised his objection from our very Mishnah. For it was stated, HER HANDIWORK, HOWEVER, AND ANYTHING SHE FINDS, EVEN IF SHE HAS NOT COLLECTED [THE PROCEEDS]; but from whom [it may be asked] is she to collect anything she finds? Consequently it must be conceded that it is this that was meant: HER HANDIWORK is like ANYTHING SHE FINDS; as anything she finds belongs to her father39 [if she finds it] during his lifetime, and to herself [if she finds it] after his death40 so also in the case of her handiwork, [if it was done] during the lifetime of her father it belongs to her father [but if it was done] after his death it belongs to herself. Thus it may be concluded [that the ruling of R. Shesheth stands refuted].41
So it was also stated:42 Rab Judah ruled in the name of Rab, The handiwork of a daughter who is maintained by her brothers belongs to herself. Said R. Kahana: What is the reason? Because it is written in Scripture And ye make them an inheritance for your children after you,43 [implying]: 'them'44 [you may make an inheritance] 'for your children', but not your daughters for your children. This tells us that a man may not transmit his authority45 over his daughter to his son.46 To this Rabbah demurred: It might be suggested that the Scriptural text47 speaks of [payments in connection with] the seduction of one's daughter, fines and mayhem!48 And so did R. Hanina learn: The Scriptural text47 speaks of [payments in connection with] the seduction of one's daughter, fines and mayhem!49
Is not mayhem injury involving bodily pain?50 — R. Jose b. Hanina replied:
The wound [may be supposed to] have been made in her face.1
Rab2 Zera stated in the name of R. Mattena who had it from Rab: (others assert [that it was] Rabbi2 Zera who stated in the name of R. Mattena who had it from Rab): The handiwork of a daughter who is maintained by her brothers belongs to herself, for it is written in Scripture, And ye make them an inheritance for your children after you3 [implying]: 'Them'4 [you may make an inheritance] 'for your children', but not your daughters for your children. This tells us that a man may not transmit his authority over his daughter to his son.5
Mar the son of Amemar said to R. Ashi, Thus the Nehardeans have laid down: The law is in agreement with the ruling of R. Shesheth.8
R. Ashi [however] said: The law is in agreement with Rab.9 And the law is to be decided in agreement with the view of Rab.
MISHNAH. IF A MAN GAVE HIS DAUGHTER10 IN BETROTHAL AND SHE WAS DIVORCED, [AND THEN] HE GAVE HER [AGAIN] IN BETROTHAL AND SHE WAS LEFT A WIDOW, HER KETHUBAH11 BELONGS TO HIM.12 IF HE GAVE HER IN MARRIAGE AND SHE WAS DIVORCED [AND THEN] HE GAVE HER [AGAIN] IN MARRIAGE AND SHE WAS LEFT A WIDOW, HER KETHUBAH13 BELONGS TO HER.14 R. JUDAH SAID: THE FIRST15 BELONGS TO HER FATHER.16 THEY,17 HOWEVER, SAID TO HIM: HER FATHER, AS SOON18 AS HE GIVES HER IN MARRIAGE, LOSES ALL CONTROL OVER HER.19
GEMARA. The20 reason21 is that when HE GAVE HER IN MARRIAGE [the first time] SHE WAS DIVORCED [and that when] HE GAVE HER [AGAIN] IN MARRIAGE, SHE WAS LEFT A WIDOW [for the first time],22 but if she had been left a widow twice23 she would not have been fit to marry again. The Tanna24 has thus indirectly laid down an anonymous ruling in agreement with Rabbi who holds that if [a thing has happened] twice presumption is established.25
R. JUDAH SAID: THE FIRST BELONGS TO HER FATHER. What is R. Judah's reason? — Both Rabbah and R. Joseph explained: Since her father has acquired the right to it26 at the time of the betrothal.27 Raba objected: 'R. Judah ruled that the first28 belonged to her father; R. Judah nevertheless admitted that if a father gave his daughter in betrothal while she was still a minor and she married after she had attained adolescence he has no authority over her'.29 But why? Might it not here also be argued,30 'Since her father has acquired the right to it at the time of the betrothal'?31 The fact, however, is that if any statement [in the nature mentioned] has at all been made it must have been made in the following terms:32 Both Rabbah and R. Joseph explained: Because it33 was written while she was still under his authority.34
As to the recovery [of a kethubah],35 from which date may distraint be effected?36 — R. Huna replied: The hundred37 or the two hundred38 from the date of the betrothal39 and the additional jointure40 from that of the marriage.41 R. Assi, however, replied: The former as well as the latter [may be distrained upon only] from the date of the marriage.42
But could R. Huna, however, have given such a ruling?43 Has it not been stated: If a wife produced against her husband two kethuboth, one for two hundred, and one for three hundred zuz, she may, said R. Huna, distrain from the earlier date if she wishes to collect the two hundred zuz [but if she desires to collect the] three hundred zuz she may distrain from the later date only. Now if the ruling were as stated44 she should be entitled, should she not, to distrain to the extent of two hundred zuz from the earlier date and to that of one hundred from the later date? — But [even] according to your conception [it might equally be objected why] should she [not] distrain for all the five hundred zuz, two hundred from the earlier date and three hundred from the later date? What then is the reason why she cannot distrain for all the five hundred? [Obviously this:] Since the man did not write in her favour,45 'I willingly added to your credit three hundred zuz to the two hundred' he must have meant to imply: 'If you desired to distrain from the earlier date you would recover [no more than] two hundred, and if you desired to distrain from the later date you would receive three hundred'.
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